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A STUDY IN PERFIDY
ALLAN D. VESTALt
"Crooked judges exist. 'Fixed' decisions are realities."'
Little has been written about dishonest conduct on the part of judges.
This is, perhaps, understandable since only rarely has such dishonesty
been disclosed. However, an incomplete, inaccurate picture of our courts
is obtained if the shady, the abnormal, is not reported along with the
normal. The first step in any meaningful analysis of the judicial process
is complete and accurate ihformation about the operation of our courts.
It seems, therefore, eminently desirable that any deviational conduct on
the part of judges be accurately reported so that it becomes part of the
available data. Probably the outstanding example of dishonesty on the
federal bench is found in the life of Martin T. Manton, one-time senior
circuit court of appeals judge.
B3ACKGROUND
The background of Judge Martin T. Manton-a man infamous not
famous-can only be sketched in. Judge Manton was born on August 2,
1880. In his twenty-first year he received his LL.B. from Columbia
University. This was the first of six degrees he was to receive in his
legal career. He was admitted to practice in New York in 1901 and
started his practice in Brooklyn. After ten years he moved into New
York City and became a partner in the firm of Cochran and Manton.
Married in 1907, the Mantons did not have children of their own but
adopted two children.-
On August 23, 1916, Judge Manton was appointed a Judge of the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York by Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson,3 succeeding Charles N. Hough.4 At the time he
went on the bench he was worth upward of a million dollars after just
t Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.
1. Frank, Are Judges Hunwn? 80 PA. L. REv. 17, 34 (1931).
2. The Court of Appeal decision affirming the conviction of Judge Manton is
found in 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1940). The Court of
Appeals was composed of Supreme Court Justice Stone and retired Justice Sutherland
and Court of Appeals Judge Charles E. Clark who was appointed to the court on
March 9, 1939, after Judge Manton resigned. 101 F.2d v.
See, for geieral background, Records in Manton v. United States in Court of Ap-
peals for Second Circuit (hereinafter referred to as Record) 617 et seq. and WHo's
WHo IN LAW 587-88 (1937 ed.).
3. 233 Fed. xxvii.
4. Ibid.
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fifteen years of practice.' His first opinion is found in Volume 235 of
the Federal Series.6 In his almost 23 years on the federal bench he was
to write over 650 opinions.7 After less than two years on the district
bench in 1918 Judge Manton was advanced to the Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit by President Wilson. After he had been on the court
for twelve years he became the senior circuit judge.'
On December 7, 1929, Judge Manton gave an address at the laying
of the cornerstone of the new law building of the New York County
Lawyers' Association. Mr. Martin Conboy, chairman of the law build-
ing committee, introduced Judge Manton as a judge who has "a very
deep sympathy with this organization and the ideals that it represents and
a spirit of splendid and fine courtesy to the members of the profession
appearing in his court."'  In his speech Judge Manton talked of the role
of the lawyer and the duties of the advocate. Concluding his address
he said:
Members of the Bar today, lawyers, remember your duty to
manly independence and courteous dignity. If I were reformu-
lating your oath of office, I would place therein these words:
"I will forever, at all hazards, assert the dignity, independence
and integrity of the American Bar, without impartial justice
[sic], the most valuable part of American life, can have no
existence."
The national courts hold in high esteem the New York
County Lawyers Association. Its constant watch and fruitful
aid in matters pertaining to the material wants of our court and
judicial requirements has long been appreciated. Its great in-
terest in the maintenance of the Bar's ethical and high standard
has 'made for a strong Bar. The devotion to the individual
judges of the court has eased their labors and gratified their
hearts. We of the Bench have an affection based upon this
constant kindness and respectful attention which is bound to be
enduring. May we work on in common accord in our common
mission for the true administration of justice ..
5. Record 659.
6. In re Mason-Seaman Transp. Co. 235 Fed. 974 (2d Cir. 1916).
7. Record 626.
8. Record 619. For general background, see Record 617 et seq.
9,- YEARBOOK, NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERs' AssocIATioN 315 (1930). Judge Man-
ton was not, in fact, a benevolent judge. For an example of his conduct on the bench,
see LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 142 (1950). And see note
29 infra.
10. YEARBOOK, NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERs' AssociATioN 316, 320 (1930).
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Judge Manton later wrote an article on "Popularizing" the Law and
"Legalizing" the News which appeared in the United States Law Review.
The article began by recognizing the fact that the public generally depre-
ciates and distrusts the legal profession. Several examples of this feeling
were cited and judge Manton pointed out that our laws and the legal pro-
fession were in great need of a thoroughgoing interpretation to the
general public. He stated:
But something should be done about all this, and the prime re-
sponsibility for its doing rests upon the lawyers, not because
such episodes threaten the legal profession with destructive as-
sault or annihilation, but because they tend to undermine the
confidence of the citizen in the justness and soundness of our
government and in the general standards of honesty and probity
of the public servants, upon whom have been devolved the duties
of enactment, interpretation and administration of the laws.
The fact is, of course, that only in the rarest cases are such
officials faithless to their trust."
Early in the twenties, Judge Manton's continuing interest in activi-
ties outside the field of law was apparent. The Forest Hills Terrace
Corporation, one of the basic building blocks of the Manton empire, was
organized." This corporation held pieces of property in the New York
area including 206 acres in Jackson Heights. Indicating the scope of
this activity, by 1928 this piece of property was subject to a mortgage of
more than 1,800,000 dollars.'
Sometime around 1929 a man named William J. Fallon visited
Judge Manton. As Judge Manton remembered the visit it took place in
Bayport, at the Judge's home, and at the time Fallon attempted to sell
the Judge certain stock in an encyclopedia company. This was not the
first meeting of the two. Some fifteen or twenty years before this
meeting Fallon was a witness in a murder case on Long Island in which
Judge Manton was an attorney for the defense. Fallon was around
11. Manton, "Populari.-ing" the law and "Legalizing" the News. 65 U.S.L. REv.
419, 421 (1931). Excerpts from letters received by United States Law Review praising
Judge Manton's article appear in 65 U.S.L. REV. 520-22 (1931).
In 1929 Judge Manton collected in an article his ideas on building up a law practice.
The article reflected the high ethical standards which seemingly were the basis of the
judge's philosophy at that time. Manton, Building Up a Law Practice, 63 U.S.L. Rv.
566 (1929). See also the opinion written by Judge Manton affirming the conviction of
the Alien Property Custodian for defrauding the government, United States v. Miller,
24 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1928).
12. Record 658. The close relationship between Manton and the Forest Hills Ter-
race Corporation can hardly be questioned. Record 658.
13. Record 679.
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during the trial, but the friendship of the two did not date from this
early meeting. 4 Rather the 1929 meeting apparently was the start of the
close association of the two. The friendly nature of the relationship
of the two was not-and could not-be denied. Indeed, in Judge Man-
ton's brief on appeal from his conviction, it was stated, "it is, of course,
true that the appellant knew and was friendly with Fallon."'
One of the turning points of the Manton career was the depression
which started in 1929. Manton was a speculator of the most extreme
sort-the type of individual who would suffer most in a depression. He
had borrowed vast sums of money. For example, on December 16, 1929,
he personally borrowed 345,000 dollars from Samuel Ungerleider and
Company." This unsecured loan was made just shortly after the break
in the market and was made to the man who was then making a relatively
small salary as a court of appeals judge. During the early years of "this
terrible depression" as he described it,'" Judge Manton saw his estate di-
minish from one valued in the millions until on June 14, 1934, he could
swear that he was insolvent-in debt to the extent of more than 500,000
dollars with very few assets.' Judge Manton remarked at one time:
"I know there was a depression. I felt it myself."' 9 Financially Manton
found himself on the verge of ruin; psychologically the impact must
have been extreme.20
In a speech before the American Bar Association made in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, on Friday, September 1, 1933, Judge Manton re-
marked:
All this change in the outward conditions of our life is most
extraordinary. See how characters in the current scenes have
changed and have disappeared. See how the amazing company
of yesterday has disappeared in silence. The greatest utility
man of the Middle West is outlawed in Greece; two men
thought to be unexcelled bankers in New York City are out of
14. Record 628.
15. Appellant's brief p. 19. For the closeness of this relationship, see Record 586
et seq.
16. Record 720-21.
17. Record 658.
18. Government Exhibit #120, Record 999.
19. Record 784.
20. In the statement issued announcing his resignation, Judge Manton referred to
the depression and indicated that he was forced by the economic developments which had
occurred to incur obligations, that is, borrow money. N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1939, p. 8.
For Judge Manton's analysis of the depression, see his speech given at the annual meet-
ing of the Vermont Bar Association in October, 1933, found in 27 REPORT OF PRocED-
INGs (1934) 130, 136, wherein he stated, referring to the depression, "A lesson taught
the profession from this is that nothing can take the place of that commodity called an
honest lawyer."
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Banking; a Swede, thought to be the miracle man of inter-
national finance, is a suicide; a banking house that sold his
securities-his wares-is demobilized. These and others too
numerous and unnecessary to mention are as completely severed
from the life of the nation as if they were in their graves.2
Certainly the misuse of office of Judge Manton can only be understood
when one considers the background of the depression which was felt so
keenly by Judge Manton.
In the years immediately after the crash, until 1935 or 1936, Judge
Manton found himself in urgent need of funds to recoup his fortune.
Commenting on the malfeasance of Judge Manton at the close of his trial,
the presiding Judge, Judge W. Calvin Chesnut, viewed this economic
pressure as extremely important. Judge Chesnut stated:
Viewed as a whole, the evidence in the case is susceptible of
the following interpretation. The defendant, a high judicial
officer of the United States Government, was possessed of a
great personal fortune which, being largely invested in cor-
porate equities, was seriously threatened by financial condi-
tions existing a few years ago. In the attempt to save his for-
tune he violated the most fundamental feature of his judicial
office which requires absolute impartiality and personal dis-
interestedness in the performance of official duties, and agreed
to use the power and influence of his great position to procure
large sums of money by loans or otherwise from litigants, to
bolster up his fading fortune.
It is unfortunately true that in other walks of life other
persons have yielded to the temptation to use unlawful methods
to avert financial disaster in a period of abnormal economic
conditions; but this, of course, affords no excuse for the de-
fendant in this case. All public office is a public trust; but the
judicial office is even more than that-it is a sacred trust. It
is abhorrent to our conception of public justice that a judge
should be influenced by the idea of personal profit in deciding
the controversies of other people.22
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY-LORD AND THaOMAS-SULLIVAN
Sometime, apparently in 1932, Judge Manton while walking to work
had a conversation with Louis Levy 2 of the law firm of Chadbourne,
21. 19 A.B.A.J. 596 (1933).
22. 25 A.B.A.J. 576 (1939).
23. The close relationship of Manton and Levy and the making of the $250,000
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Stanchfield & Levy, then representing the American Tobacco Company
in a 10,000,000 dollar suit pending in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In the course of the conversation Judge Manton said
that Mr. James J. Sullivan wanted to obtain a loan of 25,000 dollars.
The judge asked Mr. Levy if he had any clients interested in making
such a loan to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Levy told the Judge to send Mr. Sul-
livan to him.24
Sullivan ultimately got a loan of a quarter of a million dollars-ten
times the amount originally mentioned-in May from Lord and Thomas,
the advertising agency for the American Tobacco Company." On June
13, 1932, in a decision written by Judge Manton, =0 the pending case was
decided in favor of the American Tobacco Company. Of the 250,000
dollars received by Sullivan, the major part went into the corporations
in which Judge Manton had substantial interests. 7
Fox THEATRES CORPORATION
In June, 1932, judge Manton, at the suggestion of counsel in an
intended suit in equity for the appointment of receivers for the Fox
Theatres Corporation, contacted one or more of the district judges con-
cerned and sought informally to persuade them that a trust company
should not be selected as a receiver for the corporation. He failed to
secure an acceptance of his view at the district court level. Failing in his
attempt, Judge Manton shortly thereafter, acting under his assignment of
1930, sat as a district judge, entertained an application for a receiver of
the corporation and appointed individual receivers." This arbitrary use
of power was clearly contrary to the wishes and practices of the judges
who normally handled such matters." The feeling of the district court
judges was clearly evident two days later when they adopted and promul-
gated two new rules known as 1-A and 11-A which became effective
loan is covered in detail in In re Levy, 30 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (disbarment
of Levy in Southern District) and In re Levy, 23 N.Y.S.2d 414 (App. Div. 1940) (dis-
barment of Levy in New York court).
24. Record 775 et seq.
25. Record 779. Judge Manton asserted that he first learned of the loan in June
of 1932. Record 783.
26. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 60
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1932).
27. Record 780 et seq.
28. Johnson v. Manhattan Railroad Company, 289 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1933). See
also Johnson v. Manhattan Railroad Company, 61 F.2d 934, 936 (2d Cir. 1932).
29. The personality of judge Manton cannot be sketched in a brief article such as
this. One author has stated, "For years Judge Manton had had a bad name among
lawyers, and his receivership appointments had looked suspicious. But there was no
evidence, and he was a fearsome personage to criticize. He had wide influence, and
his host of friends included James J. Hines." HUGHES, ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE, 318-
19 (1940).
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July 1, 1932, and were designed apparently to restrict the action of as-
signed judges in the Southern district." At a later time, on August 24,
1934, Judge Manton appointed Milton C. Weisman"' as receiver of the
Fox Theatres Corporation. The background of Mr. Weisman was very
interesting. He had acted as the attorney for Judge Manton in the settle-
ments made for the judge with several banks to which Judge Manton was
deeply indebted. Judge Manton later testified that only a small fee had
been charged by Mr. Weisman and Judge Manton did not remember
whether even the small fee had been paid. The settlements were concluded
at about the time that Mr. Weisman was appointed as a receiver for the
Fox Theatre Corporation. 2
About a year later Judge Manton was interested in receiving several
loans from the Fort Greene Bank and at that time he talked to John L.
Lotsch who was connected with the bank. According to Mr. Lotsch,
judge Manton made certain representations that if he received loans
from the Fort Green Bank deposits would be made in that bank by the
receivers for the Fox Theatre Corporation and for another corporation.
It was this Lotsch who had a case pending at this time before the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A decision was rendered by the court
of appeals on July 8, 1935, in favor of Mr. Lotsch's client. On July 19,
1935, a 15,000 dollar loan was made by the Fort Greene Bank to Judge
Manton. At about the same time deposits were received by the Fort
Greene Bank from the receiver of the Fox Theatre Corporation.3 On
July 19, 1935, the balance of deposits in the Fort Greene Bank for the
Fox Theatres Corporation was 50,000 dollars. 4 At about the same
time the balance in the Fort Greene Bank for the other receivership
mentioned was about 25,000 dollars. 5 The Fox Theatres Corporation
receivership appears once again in the Manton tale. One of the last acts
of Judge Manton as a judge was the appointment of Kenneth Steinreich
as co-trustee with Weisman of the Fox Theatres Corporation. Although
the relationship of Steinreich to Judge Manton seems to be somewhat
remote, during the course of the trial Steinreich's name appeared a num-
ber of times in connection with business transactions with Judge Man-
ton.36 Certainly there is ample evidence to show that Judge Manton was
30. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1933).
31. Milton Weisman was retained as attorney for the Evans Case Company in the
Art Metals Company case. Record 97. See text accompanying note 56-60 infra.
32. Record 765-67.
33. Record 157 et seq. See text accompanying note 81-88 infra, concerning the
Electric Autolite Company case.
34. Government Exhibit #25, Record 911.
35. Government Exhibit #27A-27E, Record 912.
36. Record 772.
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using his authority as judge to promote his own personal interests.
IRT RECEIVERSHIP
In 1932 Judge Manton asserted that the public interest required that
he sit as a district court judge in the southern district of New York."
Overriding the rules which had been promulgated by the district court
judges after the start of the Fox receivership, 8 Judge Manton ordered
that applications for the appointment of receivers be made to him as well
as to the regularly assigned district court judge. 9 Manton's apparent
reason was to prevent the appointment of a certain New York trust
company as a receiver for the Interborough Rapid Transit Company.
Manton at a later time justified his intervention at the district level in
the following terms:
It is a misapprehension of my action and of my views to as-
sume that the difference of opinion existing between the Dis-
trict Judges and myself as to the relative fitness of individuals
and trust companies as equity receivers was the sole ground up-
on which I acted in determining the existence of adequate and
sufficient public interest ...
I considered and determined that in view of the far-
reaching public interests involved, the immense numbers of the
public affected, the vast and unprecedented investment of the
city of New York in the subway system leased to the Inter-
borough Company, and the unprecedented and extraordinary
importance and complexity of the issues involved and likely to
be litigated, there was clearly presented to me a case which was
essentially within the intent and purpose of Congress as evi-
denced by sections 22, 23, and 213, and that the public interest
required the appointment of a Circuit Judge to hold the District
Court in which the case should be heard. . . .40
On the day after promulgating the order regarding applications, on
the petition of the American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company, Judge
Manton, acting as a district court judge, appointed two receivers for
the IRT.4' They were Victor Dowling and Thomas E. Murray. The
37. This order dated August 25, 1932, is found in Record 1018.
38. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
39. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 1 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). This order, dated
August 25, 1932, is found in Record 1019. Manton moved into the district court on
August 25, 1932, Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934, 936 (2d Cir. 1932).
40. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 4
F.Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
41. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 1 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
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background of these two individuals was rather interesting. Mr. Dowl-
ing was a partner in the law firm of Chadbourne, Stanchfield and Levy, 2
mentioned in connection with the American Tobacco Company Case.4"
Judge Manton also appointed as counsel in the IRT receivership the same
firm, Chadbourne, Stanchfield and Levy."'
Thomas E. Murray, the second receiver appointed in August of
1932, had sometime prior to that made an investment in the Forest Hills
Terrace Corporation, a corporation under the control of Judge Manton.
In May of 1932 and in July of 1932 Mr. Murray had given Judge Man-
ton two checks in the sums respectively of 15,000 and 7,500 dollars in
exchange for stock in the Forest Hills Terrace Corporation. One of the
checks was in fact made out to Judge Manton personally and endorsed
over to the corporation. At the time of Manton's trial in 1939 it was
brought out that Mr. Murray had received nothing in the way of divi-
dends from the investment made in 1932.," It should also be noted that
this investment of 22,500 dollars was made in a corporation which ap-
parently had very few assets at the time of the investment. When judge
Manton testified voluntarily on June 14, 1934, in the office of Carl J.
Austrian, attorney for the State Superintendent of Banks in charge of
the liquidation of the bank of the United States,46 he testified concerning
the assets and liabilities of the Forest Hills Terrace Corporation. The
substance of his testimony seemed to be that the Forest Hills Terrace
Corporation was insolvent at that time." There is no reason to believe
that this was not substantially true in 1932.
Shortly after Judge Manton's actions, a stockholder in the Man-
hattan Railway Company petitioned District Judge Woolsey to vacate
Judge Manton's orders and appointments and to appoint new receivers.
Judge Woolsey consolidated two related cases and signed an order setting
aside the appointments made by Manton as "wholly void and of no
juridical effect." 8  The operation of the order was suspended pending
outcome of appeal and the petition to vacate Manton's orders assigning
himself to hold district court and to hear applications for appointment of
receivers was denied for want of jurisdiction.
On appeal, Judge Woolsey's decree was reversed by the Court of
42. Record 786.
43. See text accompanying note 23-27 supra.
44. Record 799.
45. Record 800-01.
46. Government Exhibit #120. Record 999. See also cross examination of Judge
Manton Record 718 et seq.
47. Record 680.
48. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 1 F. Supp. 809, 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
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Appeal 9 and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. 0 The
Supreme Court, while granting that Manton possessed the power to take
the action he had taken, questioned the propriety of its exercise and sug-
gested that Manton withdraw from further participation in the receiver-
ship proceedings. The Court stated:
Granting that the latter was most sincere in what he did, there
was yet no compelling reason for assigning himself. Had he
reflected he probably would not have made such an assignment;
but he acted hastily and evidently with questionable wisdom.
This action has embarrassed and is embarrassing the receiver-
ship. If he were now to withdraw from further participation
in the receivership proceedings the embarrassment would be
relieved; and the belief is ventured here that, on further re-
flection, he will recognize the propriety of so doing and, by
withdrawing, will open the way for another judge with appro-
priate authority to conduct the further proceedings."
When the case reached Judge Manton after the Supreme Court de-
cision, he still seemed to be very reluctant to turn the matter over to an-
other judge. He spelled out, as indicated above, reasons for his actions,
and concluded: "In the light of these profound convictions and with
great respect, I cannot for the present bring myself voluntarily to with-
draw from this case, whatever may be my ultimate decision.""
Manton's ultimate decision to withdraw was spelled out in a decision
handed down September 30, 1933. He reiterated the reasons for his
continuing to sit. A further reason was given for the delay in that he
wished to dispose of issues presently before him prior to turning the
case over to another judge. He said that while he was determining
these issues:
[An] affidavit of personal bias or prejudice was filed by the
same parties who had but recently failed in the United States
Supreme Court in the question raised concerning my jurisdic-
tion.
Though my personal preference was, and the inclination
of any judge whose fairness was challenged naturally would be,
to retire from the proceedings, I felt it my duty to remain, how-
ever unpleasant and distasteful, and not to retire simply on the
49. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1932).
50. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479 (1933).
51. Id. at 505.
52. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 4
F. Supp. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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filing of an affidavit held by me to be untimely and insuffi-
cient."
Manton mentioned in closing that he was to preside over the Circuit
Court of Appeals convening in October and referred to his many admin-
istrative duties connected therewith. "The task of supervising these
receiverships, added to these other duties, is too onerous to continue an-
other year. For this reason I have decided to withdraw." 4
Manton's withdrawal came only after a restraining order had been
issued by Associate Justice Harlan F. Stone, pending action by the full
Supreme Court on an application by the Manhattan Railway Company
to divest Judge Manton of all jurisdiction in the proceedings. Circuit
Court Judge Julian W. Mack was designated by the Chief Justice to
act in Manton's stead. 5
ART METAL WORKS v. ABRAHAM- AND STRAUS
On February 18, 1932, the case of Art Metal Works v. Abraham
and Straus was docketed in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Ultimately a decision favorable to the Evans Case Company, which had
assumed the defense, was handed down on April 30, 1934, in an opinion
written by Judge Manton. 6 Judge Learned Hand dissented.
Alfred F. Reilly, president of the Evans Case Company, testifying
for the government in the Manton trial, related a tale of contacts with
William J. Fallon and arranging for payments of large sums of money
which were supposedly given to Judge Manton."' In the Court of Ap-
peals decision on the appeal of Judge Manton, Mr. Justice Sutherland,
Circuit Justice, speaking for a court composed of himself and Mr. Justice
Stone and Judge Charles E. Clark said that:
[T]he jury could have found, and, in support of their verdict
we may properly assume, did find, the following:
Reilly, president of the company, was one of the conspirators.
53. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 6
F. Supp. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
54. Id. at 221.
55. New York Times, June 4, 1939, p. 2.
56. 70 F.2d 639; 70 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1934). In the original case, 70 F.2d 639,
action was brought for patent infringement and the court had dismissed for non-infringe-
ment. In 107 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1939) on rehearing, the decree was reversed with the
majority finding that the patent had been infringed, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 621 (1939).
In a rehearing of the companion case upon the original record, 107 F.2d 944 (2d
Cir. 1939), the court held per curiam "that an incorrect result was reached by the ma-
jority of the court on the former appeal and that the decree of the District Court should
be affirmed for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge L. Hand."
57. Record 56 et seq.
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He advised with Fallon about the case on a number of occa-
sions. He gave Fallon, at the latter's request, many sums of
money aggregating thousands of dollars and for several years
carried him on the payroll of the Evans Case Company at $100
per week and paid him other sums, the whole amounting to
nearly $20,000. The district court, having decided the case
against the Evans Company, the company appealed. In another
case decided in its favor an appeal was taken by the losing
party. After some negotiations between Reilly and Fallon,
the former expressed a willingness to pay $25,000 upon Fal-
lon's assurance of favorable action by Manton on the appeal,
$15,000 to go to Manton as a loan. At a later time, Reilly was
informed by Fallon by telephone that he had learned that the
decision would be favorable and "that the Judge [Manton] was
in bad circumstances for the money and wanted to know if I
could not get $10,000 as quickly as possible." About the same
time, decisions favorable to the Evans Case Company were
handed down, the opinions being rendered by Manton. Reilly
then paid Fallon $10,000 in cash and also gave him three $500
checks. The $10,000 was entered in the books of the Evans
Case Company as "Prepaid Royalties, Air-Flow." Subsequently,
on motion of Reilly, the board of directors of the company
directed that the item be transferred to the "legal and profes-
sional account for litigation expense.""8
In the summer of 1934 Mr. Reilly met Judge Manton at the Belle
Terre Hotel at Port Jefferson on Long Island. In that summer they
met approximately five times and played golf on a few occasions. Mr.
Reilly had lunch at Judge Manton's house on two different occasions
and lunched with the Judge at the Lawyers Club. This association con-
tinued into 1935."9
The final development in this case occurred several years later. On
February 5, 1939, Mr. Reilly received a long-distance telephone call from
Judge Manton. Although there is some conflict in the evidence about
the nature of the conversation it is undisputed that Judge Manton made
the call from a telephone in the Savoy Plaza Hotel on that Sunday morn-
ing. Mr. Reilly testified that the apparent purpose of the phone call was
to cover up the payments that had been made to Mr. Fallon. Later that
day Mr. Reilly called Judge Manton and started to talk to him. Mr.
58. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 840 (1939).
59. Record 84. See also Record 629-39.
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Reilly apparently asked Judge Manton if it was all right to talk. Mr. Reilly
testified that Judge Manton said "I don't think exactly." That conver-
sation was terminated after an arrangement was made for Judge Manton
to call Mr. Reilly. Later Judge Manton called Mr. Reilly. Apparently
Judge Manton was calling from a telephone outside of his residence.
Mr. Reilly testified that the tenor followed rather closely the conversation
of the morning.6" These conversations followed close on Judge Manton's
resignation of the first of February.
WARNER LOAN
In early May, 1933, a case involving the Warner Brothers was
argued before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Man-
ton was a member of the court.6 Sometime between the arguing of the
case and the decision in the following September, Judge Manton spoke to
Mr. Warner and arranged to get some funds from Mr. Warner,
Judge Manton received a check drawn to his order for 25,000 dollars
from the Colfax Trading Company (a Harry Warner Corporation).6
Another 25,000 dollar loan was arranged and checks in the amount of
25,000 dollars received by Judge Manton on September 11, 1933, just
the day before a decision favorable to Warner Brothers was handed down
by the Court of Appeals, Judge Manton joining in the opinion."
At about the same time Judge Manton addressed the American Bar
Association. In his address delivered before the Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan, meeting on September 1, 1933, Judge Manton stated:
A young man coming out of college today, competing for
position and honor, requires a better education and should be
a finer example of the purposes of a college than ever before.
All this promises a better professional competition for the age
in which we live. The old lawyers as well as the young, to be
successful today, must bear in mind that the practice has
changed but the opportunities are measureless for integrity and
effort. As natural as day follows night, come the rewards of
honor."4
60. Judge Manton's testimony concerning the calls is found in Record 630 et seq.
Mr. Reilly's testimony concerning the calls is found in Record 85 et seq. and 115 et seq.
61. Record 788.
62. Record 788.
63. Record 790. The case was Cinema Patents Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 66
F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1933). (Record erroneously has the date of decision as Dec. 12,
1933). $40,000 had been repaid by the time of Judge Manton's trial. See Appellant's
Brief, 65.
64. Manton, A "New Deal" for Lawyers, 19 A.B.A.J. 596, 600 (1933).
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And about a month later in a speech to the Vermont Bar Associa-
tion on October 4, 1933, at its 56th annual meeting, at the Pavilion Hotel
at Montpelier, Judge Manton stated:
A lesson taught the profession from this is that nothing can
take the place of that commodity called an honest lawyer ...
Lawyers in great majority have been so true to their calling
that we have much to swell us with pride. . . . The discipline
of the bar is the discipline from within amid all the tempta-
tions. No regulations of conduct is necessary for most of our
lawyers. Here indeed is a tribute to a great profession ......
At the end of 1933, on December 27, Judge Manton administered
the oath of the United States Attorney to Mr. Martin J. Conboy who
succeeded Thomas E. Dewey. "Photographs of the ceremony showed
Postmaster General Farley back of Mr. Conboy. Back of [Judge Man-
ton] stands Dewey who was five years later to expose the judge and drag
him from the bench he was already secretly using for his own profit." 6
SETTLEMENTS
On July 23, 1934, Judge Manton and the corporations in which he
was interested settled certain primary and contingent liabilities with the
Mercantile Bank and Trust Company and the Bank of the United
States."' In the case of the Mercantile Bank, Judge Manton's indebted-
ness amounted to approximately 164,000 dollars. This was settled with
a 31,500 dollar payment."8 The liability to the Bank of the United States
was settled for 23,500 dollars. This against an original liability of
124,000 dollars. 9 This latter settlement of July 20, 1934, was approved
by Judge Kenndth O'Brien who was a director of the Alamac Esplanade
Corporation, one of the corporations apparently dominated by Judge
Manton."'
At the time of these settlements Judge Manton was examined con-
cerning his assets and liabilities."' He admitted assets of only 6,250
dollars and listed liabilities of more than a half a million dollars. It was
probable that his liabilities were closer to three quarters of a million
dollars."
65. 27 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, VERMONT BAR Ass'N 136-37 (1934).
66. HUGHES, ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE 52 (1940).
67. Record 704.
68. Record 705.
69. Record 671, 688-89.
70. Record 706 et seq.
71. Voluntary Examination in Liquidation, The Bank of United States, June 14,
1934. Government Exhibit #120, Record 999.
72. Record 685-86.
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At the time of this voluntary examination negotiations were being
carried on for the sale of certain property by a Manton corporation to
Samuel Ungerleider and associates. The contract ultimately signed on
August 17, 1934, provided for a sale price of 400,000 dollars. Of this
amount 175,000 dollars was paid to the Manton enterprise, the Forest
Hills Terrace Corporation, prior to the time the contract was executed.73
One of the checks in the amount of 25,000 dollars received in part pay-
ment for the hotel bears the date of June 11, 1934, three days before the
examination of Judge Manton. 4 In the Judge's voluntary examination
this sum of 25,000 dollars is not mentioned in any of the testimony."
Some eleven months later Judge Manton was able to state that his net
worth was close to three quarters of a million dollars. 6
Another settlement of a claim was made by Judge Manton in 1935.
In October, 1931, the judge used stock of the National Cellulose Cor-
poration as security for an obligation, and at that time apparently prom-
ised to repurchase from the Ungerleider Financial Corporation the Na-
tional Cellulose stock on or before October 26, 1935, for a price of
361,000 dollars.7 In 1935 the Judge represented to the successor in in-
terest of the LUngerleider Financial Corporation that he was "unable to
make any better settlement than $125,000,"" and the obligation was
settled for the latter figure."0 This, of course, was four months after the
Judge had written the letter indicating that he was worth upwards of
750,000 dollars."0
ELECTRIC AUTOLITE CO. V. P & D MANUFACTURING COMPANY
On April 22, 1935, the case of Electric Autolite Company v. P & D
Manufacturing Company was docketed in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. John L. Lotsch was a defense attorney. He was intro-
duced to Judge Manton by William J. Fallon after an adverse decision
had been rendered in the District Court.8" Lotsch was connected with
the Fort Greene National Bank in Brooklyn. Less than one month after
the case was docketed in the court a loan of 10,000 dollars was made to
Judge Manton by the Fort Greene Bank with Lotsch acting as an inter-
73. Record 713 et seq.
74. Record 718.
75. Record 719. Voluntary Examination in Liquidation, The Bank of United
States, June 14, 1934. Government Exhibit #120. Record 999.
76. Government Exhibit #24. Record 911.
77. Record 724.
78. Record 727.
79. Record 725.
80. Record 727.
81. Record 145 et seq. Lotsch introduced himself, according to Manton, to the
judge in the Spring of 1935. Record 642. !.
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mediary.8 2 It was at this time that judge Manton wrote a letter to the
bank stating that "This is to certify that my net worth is upwards of
$750,000. Yours very truly, Martin T. Manton."83  The Electric Auto-
lite case was argued in June of 1935 by Mr. Lotsch and Judge Manton
sat on that case.8 On July 8, 1935, a decision favorable to Mr. Lotsch
was handed down by the court with Judge Manton writing the opinion."
On July 19, 1935, the second loan was arranged for Judge Manton from
the Fort Greene National Bank.88 Mr. Lotsch indicated that statements
were made that if a loan was arranged certain deposits would be made
in the Fort Greene National Bank by certain receivers of corporations.
And on July 19, 1935, as mentioned before, deposits were made in the
Fort Greene National Bank by Milton C. Weisman, receiver of the Fox
Theatres. 7
In October, 1935, the Fort Greene National Bank made a loan of
25,000 dollars to Mr. James J. Sullivan, a business associate of Judge
Manton. Some stock belonging to Judge Manton was used as collateral
and Judge Manton guaranteed payment. In December, 1935, Mr. Sulli-
van died and Manton assumed this obligation to the Fort Greene Na-
tional Bank.88
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. THE PREFERRED ELECTRIC AND
WIRE CORPORATION
In September of 1935, the case of General Motors Corporation v.
The Preferred Electric and Wire Corporation was docketed in the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. John L. Lotsch was an attorney in
this case as he was in the Electric Autolite case. In the lower court a re-
quest for a stay had been denied and Lotsch then applied to Judge Man-
ton for a stay. Manton granted the stay8" and according to Lotsch,9 on
the day after the argument asked Lotsch for another loan of 25,000
dollars."' This is the loan that was made on October 21, 1935, to James
82. On May 10, 1935. Record 154-55.
83. Government Exhibit #24. Record 911.
84. Record 155 et seq.
85. Record 157. Electric Autolite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.
1935), reversing 8 F. Supp. 314 (E.D.N.Y. 1934), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 648 (1935).
Rehearing because of disqualification of Manton; reached same decision as before, 109
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1940).
86. Record 733.
87. Record 733. (The record is in error regarding some of the dates. This is
quite apparent on examination.) See text accompanying note 31-32 supra.
88. Record 646.
89. Record 161 et seq.
90. Manton's testimony on this point is found in Record 728.
91. Record 162. The close relationship of Judge Manton to Mr. Lotsch at this
time could hardly be denied. In Government Exhibit #37, the telephone log for the
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J. Sullivan who was president of a corporation controlled by Judge Man-
ton. The loan was guaranteed by Judge Manton.9  Sullivan then drew
his check for the full amount payable to himself which he then endorsed
in blank and which after being certified by the bank was handed to Judge
Manton.9  Manton endorsed it and deposited it to the credit of the
Ungerleider Financial Company." The decree of the lower court in the
General Motors case was reversed in an opinion written by Judge Manton.
This decision was handed down on November 4, 1935."'
Judge Manton's method of conducting business was one that sug-
gested that all was not meet and proper. During the fall of 1935 a num-
ber of transactions occurred which were indicative of the business
methods of the Judge. According to the record of the Manton trial,
during the fall of 1935 the Judge kept large amounts of cash (totalling
approximately 70,000 dollars), in the safe in his office."6 During that
period of time Nathan Levy loaned 25,000 dollars to the Judge and de-
livered the money to the Judge in cash." This was an unsecured loan."
In October, 1935, the Judge received 25,000 dollars in cash as a loan
from an unknown individual, according to the Judge's testimony, through
James J. Sullivan." All in all, during 1935, Manton received 92,000
dollars in cash.' In addition to the loans mentioned, Manton, during
1935, borrowed 15,000 dollars from Weingarten,' 24,625 dollars in
cash from William W. Bachman,' 15,000 dollars from Joseph Gans,10 3
firm of Schechter, Lotsch & Sulzberger listed incoming calls to John L. Lotsch as
follows:
Party called
Date Time In or Out or calling
Sept. 30 9:47 I Judge Manton
Oct. 2 4:50 I Judge Manton
Oct. 7 2:30 I Judge Manton
Oct. 11 1:45 I Judge Manton
The argument of the case took place on Oct. 7, 1935. Record 162.
92. Lotsch's testimony on this point is found at Record 163 et seq. Manton's guar-
antee was dated Oct. 16, 1935. Record 164.
93. Record 166 and Record 728.
94. Record 165 and Record 728.
95. General Motors Corp. v. The Preferred Electric & Wire Corp., 79 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 655 (1935). Rehearing because of Manton's dis-
qualification, 109 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Court reached same result.
96. Record 744.
97. Record 741. Levy was connected with the Kings Brewery Company which
went into bankruptcy. Apparently James J. Sullivan was appointed trustee of this
company. Levy loaned additional amounts to Judge Manton in early 1936. Record 757.
98. Record 741.
99. Record 742.
100. Record 748.
101. Record 748 et seq.
102. Record 734 et seq.
103. Record 734.
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and 5,000 dollars from Newman.' This latter was part of 25,000 dol-
lars borrowed by Newman.' All of the loans from Newman, accord-
ing to the Judge, were unsecured.'
SMITH V. HALL
On November 21, 1935, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in the case of Sinith v. Hall, a patent infringement
case. Hall was introduced to William J. Fallon and ultimately agreed
to pay 60,000 dollars to Fallon ostensibly for Judge Manton,1 7 receiving
one note from Judge Manton.' Payments were made over a period of
time with the final payment being made after a decision in Hall's favor
was handed down by Judge Manton on April 6, 1936."'0
In the Court of Appeals decision on the appeal of Judge Manton,
Mr. Justice Sutherland, Circuit Justice, speaking for a court composed
of himself, Mr. Justice Stone and Judge Clark, said that:
[T]he jury could have found, and, in support of their verdict
we may properly assume, did find, the following:
In the year 1934, an appeal was taken from the decision of the
district court in Smith v. Hall, a patent infringement case.
More than a million dollars was involved. Hall was introduced
by Forrest W. Davis, one of the defendants named in the in-
dictment, to Fallon as one who, Davis had advised, could help
him in the litigation. Hall told Fallon of the litigation and was
asked by Fallon for copies of the decision, briefs and record so
that he might show them to Manton. At a later meeting, Fal-
lon reported that Manton after a conference had said that for
$75,000 a decision in Hall's favor could be obtained. It was,
finally agreed that the amount should be reduced to $60,000.
A check was given for $5,000 on account. So far, there is no
direct evidence connecting Manton with this transaction. ' But
later along, Hall, being dissatisfied with the situation, Fallon
agreed to obtain Manton's note, and upon that basis a second
check for $5,000 was given, and thereafter Hall received a note
signed by Manton payable to Davis for $5,000."'
104. Record 748 et seq.
105. Record 749..
106. Record 749.
107. Record 477.
108. Record 484. Manton's explanation of note is found in Record 639-49.
109. Record 477-96. Smith v. Hall, 83 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1936); Smith v. James
Mfg. Co., 83 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1936) is a companion case.
110. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1939).
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After investigating this matter an F. B. I. agent, Mathias K. Grif-
fin, testified:
According to what I testified, $15,000 was deposited by
the Allied Rediscount Corporation [a Fallon corporation] in
its own account at the Sterling National Bank, which amount
was received from Hall Brothers. There was $10,500 trans-
ferred by the Allied Rediscount Corporation to the Forest Hills
Terrace Corporation .... There was $4,700 transferred from
the Forest Hills Terrace Corporation to Martin T. Manton."'
The witness testified that these transactions occurred between the 23rd
of November, 1935, and March 2, 1936.112
LOTSCH BRIBERY CASE
Attorney Lotsch, who had been instrumental in obtaining loans
from the Fort Green Bank for Judge Manton, was indicted for taking a
bribe in December, 1935."' Lotsch testified that he discussed the matter
with Judge Manton"4 and that Judge Manton stated that Judge Edwin S.
Thomas was being assigned to criminal matters when Lotsch's case
would be heard.' It was assigned to Judge Thomas. Lotsch testified
that Judge Manton told him that Thomas would take care of the case
for 10,000 dollars and that Lotsch paid it to Manton in two 5,000 dollar
payments."' 6 There was no direct proof that Judge Thomas received the
money;"' Judge Thomas was unable to testify at the time of the Manton
trial. 8
When the case was tried, Judge Thomas granted Lotsch's motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal."' Lotsch was immediately re-arrested
on a charge of extorting money under color of office. 2 ' He was in-
dicted and sued out a writ of habeas corpus and a district judge dis-
missed the writ.'' Lotsch appealed. - The appellate court then, Judge
Manton presiding, reversed the decision and directed that the indictment
111. Record 564.
112. Record 564.
113. Record 169.
114. Record 170.
115. Record 170 et seq.
116. On March 2 and 3, 1936. Record 172-78.
117. Record 178.
118. Record 794 (Testimony of Dr. C. Charles Burlingame). Judge Thomas re-
signed on April 12, 1939. 101 F.2d v.
119. Record 181.
120. Record 181-83.
121. Record 183.
122. Docketed Dec. 19, 1935.
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be dismissed.'23 In the course of the opinion the Court of Appeals criti-
cized Judge Thomas for granting the motion for a directed verdict be-
cause of a view "erroneously, we believe, held that [Lotsch] was not a
master." 24  This decision was handed down on November 30, 1936.'
RENxoFF CASE
During the establishing of the government's case against Judge Man-
ton, testimony was heard from Morris Renkoff who had been convicted
of conspiracy and receiving stolen bonds.2 and who had appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 7 Renkoff testified that he
attempted to fix his case at the Court of Appeals level through one
Charlie Rich, who was supposed to have some connection with Judge
Manton."' 7500 dollars was given as a bribe. Renkoff testified that
Judge Manton was unable to fix his case "because the other two judges
wouldn't go along with Judge Manton."' 2' Renkoff also testified that
when the fix was unsuccessful he "made a big holler about it" and that
he received his 7500 dollars back."'
Although Judge Manton did not get the conviction reversed, he did
write a letter to Alexander Holtzoff, office of the Attorney General in
Washington, as follows:"'.
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Second Judicial Circuit
Chambers of
Martin T. Manton
U. S. Circuit Judge
New York City December 22, 1936.
The Attorney General of the United States,
Washington, D. C.
Attention Mr. Alexander Holtzoff.
123. United States ex tel. Lotsch v. Kelly, 86 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1936). Lotsch tes-
tified that Judge Manton showed him a draft copy of the opinion prior to the time it
was handed down. Record 184-85.
124. 86 F.2d at 614.
125. Record 185.
126. Record 241.
127. United States v. Renkoff, 84 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
589 (1936).
128. Morris Renkoff testified "Charles Rich is the man that I have been knowing
for the last 15 years. He was the fixer for Judge Manton." Record 274.
129. Record 274.
130. Record 274.
131. Government Exhibit #46, Record 949.
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Dear Sir:
Answering your inquiry of December 15th as to Morris
Renkoff who was convicted in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York on the charge of receiv-
ing stolen bonds and sentenced to three years imprisonment and
whose conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
I may say that I presided on the appeal from that conviction.
It became necessary for me to review carefully the evidence in
that record and the errors assigned and argued on appeal. Af-
ter reading the record, I was satisfied that Renkoff's guilt was
of considerable doubt. We could not reverse because we are
without authority to review the weight of evidence. There were
no substantial errors committed which would justify our re-
versing, and therefore the conviction was affirmed.
But in view of my own doubt as to his guilt, and in answer
to your inquiry, I unhesitatingly say I think he is entitled to
executive clemency.
Respectfully,
MARTIN T. MANTON
Circuit Judge.
SCHICK INDUSTRIES v. DICTOGRAPH PRODUCTS COMPANY
This patent infringement case was docketed on December 19, 1936.
Archie Andrews, who held the principal interest in the Dictograph Com-
pany, was introduced to Morris Renkoff who agreed to "fix things. 132
Renkoff saw Fallon who was the contact with Manton and the price was
set at 25,000 dollars.' Renkoff was sent to prison in 1936 so that
he was unable to participate further.3 4 Andrews then enlisted the aid of
George Spector to whom he made large payments of money."' 5 Funds
then passed from Spector to National Cellulose Company and from this
company to the secretary of Judge Manton and to Judge Manton per-
sonally." 6 Some funds passed directly from Spector to Manton's official
132. Record 242 et seq.
133. Record 246-47.
134. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 1939).
135. Record 323 et seq.
136. Record 369 et seq. See testimony. of Carl A. Herring, FBI agent, Record
383-457. In September, 1937, $2500 was given to Judge Manton by the National Cellulose
Company allegedly for delivery to Spector as interest on the "loan" received. The
$2500 payment was never satisfactorily explained. In August, 1938, the records of the
company were subpoenaed and Judge Manton was informed of this development. Record
357-59. The company was then given a receipt from Spector for the $2500 paid in Sep-
tember, 1937 to Judge Manton. Record 358.
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secretary who was an official of a corporation in which Manton had a
large interest.""
During the course of the Schick appeal, Judge Manton took a great
interest in the case. In a proceeding that was almost, if not in fact, ex
parte he overrode the district court judge concerning the appointment of
a special master and the requirement of a bond."' The extreme interest
of Judge Manton was revealed at a later time. The attorneys for Schick
attempted to postpone the argument before the Court of Appeals so that
the case would not be heard by Judge Manton. One attorney reported
in the following language concerning the actions of Judge Manton:
After Judge Manton had indicated that he would grant the ad-
journment and had himself suggested February 4th as the date
for .the-as the adjourned date, Mr. Jeffery [attorney for
Schick] stated that he had an engagement in Virginia during
that week, that it would be extremely inconvenient for him to
argue the case on February 4th, and then turned to Mr. Neary
[attorney for Dictograph], whom he called by his first name,
and said, "Jack, will February 4th-Will February 1lth be
agreeable to you"? or words to that effect. I remember dis-
tinctly his calling him Jack, and Mr. Neary replied, "Why,
that would be perfectly all right, quite all right." Then Judge
Manton looked at Mr. Jeffery and . . . stated "This case
will be argued on February 4th."'39
The decision in the case was handed down against the Schick Company.
Judge Manton concurring in the opinion; the third judge dissented. 4
COLLAPSE
By 1937 Judge Manton seemed to be curtailing his activities off the
bench; at least the available information does not disclose business trans-
actions of the scope of those of the preceding years. In May Judge Man-
ton received 12,000 dollars from John McGrath' who had been recom-
mended for appointment as receiver or trustee of the Prudence Company
by Judge Manton. 4' McGrath had been so appointed in 1935. On May
28, 1937, McGrath received 32,000 dollars in fees. for work done in con-
nection with the Prudence Company and on that same day turned 12,000
137. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 1939).
138. Record 303 et seq.
139. Record 310.
140. Schick Dry Shaver v. Dictograph Products Co., 89 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1937)
'(Augustus Hand dissented).
141. Record 763.
142. Record 757-58.
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dollars over to Judge Manton. 4' Manton asserted that in July or August,
he borrowed 10,000 dollars from Barren Collier who was dead at the
time of the Manton trial. Manton asserted that this loan was received in
cash; no security was given for the loan. 1 44
By 1938 the net was closing in on Judge Manton. In May or June,
1938, the records of the Forest Hill Corporation and all of Judge Man-
ton's records were turned over to John E. Morrow, Manton's account-
ant.14" Mr. Morrow died a short time later and the records were un-
available at the time of the Manton trial.146 On July 1, Judge Manton
phoned Forrest W. Davis concerning the loan supposedly made ;17 Judge
Manton asked Davis if he had loaned money to the Judge. Davis, at the
time, stated that he did not know anything about a loan.' 48
In August the records of the National Cellulose Company were sub-
poenaed; all of the various aspects of Judge Manton's dealings were be-
ing investigated. 4" At this time Judge Manton's reputation was still ex-
cellent in some circles. On June 24, 1938, the Judge wrote the foreword
to the first edition of Moore's Federal Practice, in which he stated:
Something of this . . . spirit of resistance against an out-
moded judicial system has been evident in business circles for
some time. Business men have sought, by means outside the
pale of the law, to find a way of adjusting their differences
without recourse to the sluggish and cumbersome judicial
methods which have given us such an unenviable name. This
widespread prejudice has been hurtful to our courts, although
it has not been their fault entirely...
This from the man who had done more to tarnish the reputation of the
federal courts than any other man in the history of the country. Cer-
tainly the unwillingness of businessmen to trust their affairs to the court
on which Judge Manton was sitting was entirely understandable.
The final curtain on the judicial career of Judge Manton fell in early
143. Dewey's letter to Chairman of the House of Representative's Judiciary Com-
mittee, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1939, p. 1 (continued on p. 3).
144. Record 750.
145. Record 583-84.
146. Record 584-85.
147. Supra, n. 10.
148. Record 527-28. Judge Manton's testimony on this is found Record 641. "In
the summer of 1938, after the beginning of an official investigation respecting Manton,
Davis, who theretofore had never met Manton, received a telephone call from him in
response to which Davis called on Manton at the latter's residence. Manton asked him
whether he, Davis, had lent any money to Manton. Davis replied that he had not.
Here, again, Manton admitted the conversation, but gave a different version of it."
United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 841 (2d Cir. 1939).
149. Record 357-59.
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1939. At least three investigations had been undertaken into his affairs,
and all three were nearing completion at about the same time. On Wed-
nesday, January 25, the Attorney General had a conference with Judge
Manton and at that time the Judge gave assurances that his resignation
would be forthcoming. 5 ' This apparently was the result of an investiga-
tion which had been conducted by the Justice Department. The New
York World Telegram published the first of a series of articles on Judge
Manton two days after the conference between the Judge and the Attor-
ney General. 5' Thomas E. Dewey, then District Attorney, also had been
investigating Judge Manton for some time. When things started
breaking:
Dewey called his assistants into conference, and they agreed
that it was their duty to lay before the Judiciary Committee the
evidence they had accumulated proving that Manton had ac-
cepted separate bribes aggregating $435,000.
Four men in the Racket Bureau worked all Saturday night
and Sunday. Dewey telephoned Chairman Sumners [of the
House of Representative's Judiciary Committee] and explained
what he was preparing. . . . [T]he Manton letter . . . was
finished at 4 P. M. Dewey signed it and sent it, and later gave
a copy of it to the press." 2
On Monday, January 30, 1939, Judge Manton resigned;.5 his resigna-
tion was accepted on February 1.'"
Just two days before Judge Manton had stepped to a phone in the
Savoy Plaza Hotel on his way home from Mass and had called Alfred F.
Reilly. Two other calls had been made between these two gentlemen that
day. '5  Judge Manton knew that the end was at hand. Irresistibly, the
course of events was moving. The die was cast. An indictment was re-
turned against Judge Manton covering six cases heard by the court of
appeals. They were the Art Metals case, Smiths v. Hall, the Electric Auto-
lite case, the General Motors case, United States v. Lotsck, and the Schick
case.
i 6
150. New York Times, Jan. 31, 1939, p. 1.
151. New York Times, Jan. 29, 1939, p. 1.
152. HUGHES, ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE 320 (1940).
153. 100 F.2d v.
154. Record 652. Judge Manton's last opinion was handed down on Jan. 23, 1939,
in United States v. Kay, 101 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1939). Judge Manton's last judicial act
apparently was participation in a decision banded down the day before his resignation
was accepted, United States ex rel. Mazur v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1939).
155. Record 630 et seq. Record 85 et seq. See text accompanying note 56-60 supra.
156. It should not be assumed that the indictment covered all of the questionable
activities of the Judge. For example, in a case not mentioned in the indictment the
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TRIAL
The trial of Judge Manton was anticlimatical and, on the whole,
rather uneventful. Calling forty witnesses and introducing 125 exhibits
the government methodically traced the transactions and malfeasances of
Judge Manton. A vast amount of work had gone into preparation of
the case. Vast numbers of records and accounts had been subpoenaed
so that the government was able to reconstruct many of the deals and
arrangements.
The defense called as its first witnesses eight individuals to vouch
for the reputation for truthfulness and veracity of the defendant."57 They
were Alfred E. Smith; John W. Davis; John H. Delaney, chairman of
the Board of Transportation of the City of New York; Raoul E. Des-
vernine, President of the Crucible Steel Company of America; George B.
Ford, Catholic Counselor at Columbia University; Judge Alfred J. Tal-
ley; John O'Connor, practicing lawyer; and Emmett J. McCormack,
Treasurer of the Moore & McCormack Steamship Company. They all
vouched for the reputation of Judge Manton. The government did not
cross examine any of the character witnesses. The case for the defense
rested almost entirely on the testimony of Miss Marie D. Schmalz,"'5
secretary to Judge Manton, and of Judge Manton. Both were examined
and cross-examined at length. The defense also called Judges Harrie B.
Chase, Thomas W. Swan, Augustus N. Hand, and Learned Hand. Each,
under examination, testified that at the time of the conference in the
various cases they did not observe "anything about Judge Manton other
than he was conferring on the case according to his oath and according
to his conscience. . . ." No questions were asked of these judges by the
government."'o Although it is difficult to tell from the record whether
Court of Appeals felt that the original decision of the court with Manton sitting was
so suspect that it vacated its decision, stating: "This appeal was before us at a prior
term of court and an opinion was rendered which is reported in 2d Cir., 97 F.2d 513. At
the current term a motion was made by the trustee in bankruptcy to vacate our decision,
recall our mandate, reinstate the appeal and grant a re-argument on the ground that one
of the judges who participated in the former decision was disqualified by personal in-
terest. This motion was granted and the case has been reargued upon the original and
supplemental briefs." In re 671 Prospect Avenue Holding Corp., 105 F.2d 960, 961
(2d Cir. 1939).
The amount of money received by Judge Manton in the various transactions has
been the subject of some dispute. Thomas E. Dewey in his investigation came to the
conclusion that the total amounted to $435,000. HUGHES, ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE 320
(1940). The New York Times in reporting the conviction mentioned the figure
$664,000. N. Y. Times, June 4, 1939, p. 1.
157. Record 570-73.
158. Miss Schmalz had served as secretary to Judge Manton for 34 years, Record
581. Starting in 1926-27 she had been Treasurer of the Forest Hills Terrace Corpora-
tion. Record 581.
159. Record 791-94.
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the principal witnesses for the defense were effective or not, there is rea-
son to believe that perhaps their testimony left something to be desired.
There were occasional, bitter exchanges between the attorney for
the government and Judge Manton 6. and Miss Schmalz.' Mr. Cahill
set the tone of his cross-examination when he first spoke to Judge Man-
ton, stating "Now Mr. Witness . . 1 2 Mr. Cahill continued to refer
to Judge Manton in this manner. At one time this exchange took place:
Question by Mr. Cahill: Now, let us turn to the question of
the bank indebtedness, Mr. Witness.
Answer: Mr. Manton.
Question by Mr. Cahill: Now, let us turn to the question of
the indebtedness, Mr. Witness-
Answer: Mr. Manton.
Question: (Continuing)-In June of 1934 the Harriman Na-
tional Bank--- 63
A short while later the following exchange took place:
The Court: I think this is perhaps the most relevant inquiry.
In summation at the time of that examination do I understand
160. Defendants' Witness, Martin T. Manton, Cross Examination:
"Q. Now, you stated in respect to whatever equity there was left over
and above the mortages in the Esplanade Hotel, and I quote: 'It is thought there
isn't any equity left in that.' Did you not so state? A. Yes, I think that was
the condition of the real estate market at the time.
Q. "That is not what I am asking you. A. That is exactly what you are.
Mr. Cahill: That is not what I am asking him, if your Honor please.
I am asking him, did he so state.
The Court: Very well.
Record 675.
"The Court: It is-perhaps natural enough that you know about it, but I
think you should try not to go beyond the question.
The Witness: I do not see the competency of it all.
Mr. Cahill: Now, is the witness sitting as the judge in the court?
Mr. Noonan: Your Honor, I object to that.
The Court: I will rule when I think necessary. Mr. Cahill please proceed."
Record 676.
161. Defendants' Witness, Marie D. Schmalz, Cross Examination:
"Q. In answer to his Honor's last question, do you mean to testify that
although Judge Manton was not in town that you never communicated with
Judge Manton when he was out of town? A. Why should I?
Q. Now, Madam, will you tell us did-you ever communicate with Judge
Manton when he was out of town? A. Did7 I ever communicate with Judge
Manton when he was out of town? Did I ever communicate with him?
Q. Yes. A. Certainly.
Q. Now, this- A. I was his secretary, Mr. Cahill.
Q.. So we have heard. A. I am glad you have."
Record 599.
162. Record 660.
163. Record 667.
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the substance of what you were telling the examiner was that
you had not only no income other than your salary but that
you had no net worth on the then present values?
The Witness: [Judge Manton] Not present worth. (Address-
ing Mr. Cahill) : Now, will you just contain yourself for a
moment and let me finish-
Mr. Cahill: Your Honor, may I have some-
The Court: Of course, I appreciate, Judge Manton, that
this is your personal case and from that you may have some
feeling. I am going to ask you-
The Witness: Pardon me.
The Court: I do not think it will be appropriate for you to
undertake yourself to admonish the United States Attorney.
Now, let us proceed. What was your question ?164
Occasionally the principal witnesses for the defense were unable to
explain or remember facts concerning various transactions.' The fact
that the records of the Forest Hills Corporation and the personal records
of Judge Manton were unavailable certainly did not help. The explana-
tion concerning their disappearance was at best a rather implausible one.16
The jury was out only four hours before returning a verdict of
guilty and of this time more than an hour was spent in eating dinner.
Certainly the time spent suggests that there was no serious question in
the jury's mind about the guilt of the Judge.
An appeal of the conviction was heard in the Court of Appeals by a
court composed of two Supreme Court justices, Sutherland, who was
recalled from retirement, and Stone and a court of appeals judge, Charles
E. Clark, who was not on the bench at the time Judge Manton was on the
court."7 On December 4, 1939, the court of appeals unanimously af-
164. Record 679-80.
165. For example, Defendants' Witness, Marie D. Schmalz, Re-direct Examination:
"By the Court:
Q. How was this $3,000 in September, 1937, paid? A. I can't tell you at
the moment. I know I paid it.
Q. Well, was the $3,000 paid in cash or by check, or how was it paid?
A. Well, I cannot tell you at the moment, I really don't know, but I know that
I paid it.
Q. How can you tell us that you know you paid it, if you have no recol-
lection of how it was paid? Did you get any receipt for it at the time? A. No.
Q. Did you get an endorsement on the back of the note? A. I would not
remember that.
Q. If you paid it in cash, would you not have taken a receipt for it?
A. Yes."
Record 615.
166. Record 583-85.
167. Judge Clark was appointed on March 9, 1939, 101 F.2d v.
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firmed the conviction.' A petition for writ of certiorari was denied by
the Supreme Court of the United States in a memorandum opinion.""D
Judge Manton served some nineteen months of his two-year sentence in
the Northeastern Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburgh, Pennsylvania. He
died shortly after the end of World War II, on November 17, 1946, in
Fayetteville, New York.""
Perhaps it is true that breaches of trust are extremely rare among
judges, btt there can be no doubt that judges in high places have been
guilty of malfeasance in office. England has had her Lord Bacon and
Lord Macclesfield; both holding the highest judicial positions and both
convicted of breaches of trust. We in America have had our Manton
and perhaps others.' We would be remiss if we should assume that
judges are above examination. Judges are human, and as humans, can
err. We must expect that occasionally a judge will be corrupt and we
should be prepared for this "grievance of grievances."' 72  We cannot
cloak such malfeasance in a robe of silence and pretend that it does not
exist. The law must be prepared to handle effectively such occasional
deviations in order to guarantee the unbiased justice which is the foun-
dation of our system.
A second lesson to be learned is that judges have a moral obligation
to rid themselves of outside interests that might affect or appear to af-
fect the decisional processes. As has been stated:
This unfortunate case emphasizes a distinct moral which
has long been recognized, that the members of the judiciary
should not concern themselves with the active conduct of busi-
ness, directly or indirectly. The judge must not only really be
above suspicion but he must also appear to be above suspi-
*cion. . . . Active conduct of business affairs must inevitably
give rise to injurious comment which may reflect on the honor
of the Bench.
This does not mean that the judge who happens to have
resources must sell all he has and give it to the poor. But it
does mean that, in discharge of his duty, he should act as though
he had done just that. This is exactly how the overwhelming
number of Federal judges have always acted and may be ex-
pected to act.' 8
168. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
169. 309 U.S. 664 (1940).
170. Time, Nov. 25, 1946, p. 100; Newsweek, Dec. 2, 1946, p. 61.
171. Frank, Are Judges Huma?, 80 PA. L. Rav. 17, 34 (1931).
172. A description used by Lord Coke, speaking to Lord Chancellor, Frances Ba-
con, BoWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 426 (1956).
173. Editorial, 25 A.B.A.J. 576, 577 (1939).
